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Abstract. Individualized services are common in distributed computing sys-
tems: Consumers demand custom solutions and service providers tailor their of-
fering. In negotiating a service contract, providers and consumers frequently 
fail in identifying the optimal combination of non-functional properties and 
price. A key reason is that negotiators simultaneously try to create and claim 
value leading to strategic bidding and inefficient outcomes.  
We present a theoretical comparison of three negotiation mechanisms in the 
scenario of self-interested, rational agents bilaterally negotiating over service 
quality and price. Two mechanisms are stylized representations of mechanisms 
commonly used in theory and practice, one is newly introduced. The mecha-
nisms are characterized in terms of truthfulness of agents, efficiency of out-
comes, and distribution of welfare. 
The analysis is an extension to the field of bilateral multi-attribute negotiations, 
relevant for researchers and practitioners designing markets for individualized 
IT services and for human and computer agents acting in such markets. 
Keywords: Consumerization, Service Quality, Service Management, Negotia-
tion Strategy, Automated Negotiation 
1 Introduction 
Today, consumerization of products and services is well-set in almost any domain. 
For services, individual and close interaction between consumer and provider happens 
almost by definition. With technological progress and rising customer expectations, 
off-the-shelf offerings to fit the greatest common denominator of consumer demands 
go out of date in favor of individualized solutions. In this trend, quality marks the 
center of attention besides price and functional requirements. This is especially the 
case for IT-based services, with Cloud services being in the focus of current attention. 
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1.1 Individualized Quality-Differentiated Services 
There are different types of Cloud services available, forming a continuum from very 
small atomic services that serve a very distinct purpose to very large services, built 
manually and on demand for important consumers. Atomic services are highly stand-
ardized and typically address the volume business segment, trying to sell the same 
service to as many customers as possible while keeping transaction costs at a mini-
mum. An example for such a very small service is WhatsApp, a messaging service for 
smartphone users. It is offered in a single quality for a fixed price. Very large services 
on the other hand are situated in the value business segment, trying to meet the very 
individual needs of substantial consumers. Examples include IT outsourcing by IBM, 
SAP and others. 
In this work, we focus on medium sized service offers in the middle of the afore-
mentioned continuum. With Dropbox and Amazon Web Services as examples, these 
services are characterized by a set of different service levels. They try to compromise 
value and volume business by advertising different versions and qualities of the same 
basic functionality. With increasing number of versions, services are provided in a 
mass customization manner, which becomes very profitable if transaction costs can be 
effectively reduced by automation. 1&1 Dynamic Cloud Server, for example, offers 
almost a continuum of different service configurations for consumers to choose from 
through a simple Web interface.1 In this example, the configurations are rather close 
to technical specifications, the extension to Service Level Agreements (SLAs) is, 
however, straightforward. 
In the trend of an increasing demand for short-lived and ad hoc outsourcing, it be-
comes even more important to reduce transaction costs through automating the 
agreement process for customized services. The agreement on quality attributes of a 
customized service is neither black nor white: The consumer may have an optimal 
service offer in mind which would perfectly fulfill her needs along multiple quality 
dimensions, paired with a maximum willingness to pay. Offerings that yield slightly 
lower quality may still be good enough, yet come along with a decreased willingness 
to pay. In the following we assume that the consumer’s preferences over quality at-
tributes can be expressed in a scoring rule or function [1-3]. 
1.2 Negotiation of Service Agreements 
It has long been postulated that the wide-spread, fine-grained use of IT services in 
cross-organizational environments requires low transaction costs in negotiating ser-
vice agreements [4]. This implies multiple challenges: Negotiating parties need to 
have a common understanding of the negotiation object, e.g., via a domain ontology. 
Parties need a negotiation mechanism to follow in their negotiation and, finally, each 
party needs a decision making model to automate its internal decision making. See [4-
6] for early approaches to these challenges. Over the last years, economic mecha-
                                                           
1 http://hosting.1und1.de/cloud-server-config (accessed on Nov. 26, 2012) 
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nisms for service negotiation and management became more prominent; see [7] for a 
recent survey. 
In this paper, we address the challenge of selecting a negotiation mechanism, by 
proposing and comparing three mechanisms. Multiple mechanisms need to be de-
signed and deployed as consumers and providers have different goals, objectives, 
strategies, and requirements [7]. A multi-dimensional negotiation between consumer 
and provider typically includes an integrative and a distributive element. The integra-
tive element shall identify the optimal service level that maximizes the difference 
from consumer utility and provider costs. In other words and when expressing con-
sumer utility in monetary terms, it specifies the economic surplus created in the nego-
tiation. The distributive element determines how the economic surplus is actually 
distributed between the negotiating parties. Thus, in this part, the market participants 
claim their stake in the value created by the agreement. Negotiators acting strategical-
ly typically address integrative and distributive elements in parallel. They thereby 
limit their own ability to mutually maximize the economic surplus. 
A negotiation mechanism or, more general, a market mechanism is typically 
judged with respect to four desirable economic characteristics: individual rationality, 
incentive compatibility, (ex-post) allocation efficiency, and budget balance [8]. The 
economic outcome of such a setting is restricted by a multitude of strong theoretic 
results: Given quasi-linear preferences, it is impossible to design a mechanism that 
achieves individual rationality, efficiency, and budget balance at once, regardless if 
incentive compatibility is fulfilled or not [8].2 However, incentive compatibility is the 
prerequisite for an efficient outcome. Hence, the named characteristics need to be 
balanced. Efficient mechanisms can lead to a considerable need to plough in money, 
as the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanisms give proof of [e.g., 9]. Likewise, 
individually rational and budget balanced mechanisms can result in highly inefficient 
outcomes [10]. Additionally, budget balance and individual rationality are required to 
enable sustainability and implementability over time [11].  
In this work, we evaluate three suitable mechanisms for bilateral negotiations on 
multiple attributes with respect to their economic properties. Two are stylized repre-
sentations of existing mechanisms, one – DISCOUNTBIDDING – is newly introduced in 
this article. We maintain the requirements of individual rationality and budget bal-
ance, abandon incentive compatibility, and study the effect of strategic bidding on 
efficiency and distribution of economic surplus in different settings. Following, we 
define the market scenario in more detail and review related work. We then formalize 
the negotiation mechanisms, analyze strategic behavior and outcomes, and compare 
the mechanisms in settings under complete and incomplete information with different 
levels of risk and risk aversion. In the last section, we summarize the results, sketch 
the limitations, and outline future work. 
                                                           
2 The result is derived in Theorem 1 of [8]. Their Theorem 2, provides the grounds for testing 
whether a given incentive-compatible, individually rational mechanism maximizes the ex-
pected economic surplus. This does, however, not apply to the present scenario, as its ro-
bustness depends on knowledge of both distributions of player types, it is restricted to sin-
gle-attribute negotiations and a trusted third party is required. 
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2 Scenario & Related Work 
In order to evaluate the performance of different negotiation mechanisms, we consult 
a market scenario that is typical for custom services such as Cloud services: Multiple 
consumers are interested to procure a service of a particular functionality. Price and 
quality attributes play a major role. The consumers are endowed with heterogeneous 
preferences; their individual willingness to pay subject to a certain quality level is not 
fully known to the public. 
Multiple providers are present in the market. They offer one or more custom ser-
vices that fit the functional requirements of the consumer, yet differ in their quality of 
service and price. A key assumption is that providers have different technologies and 
internal processes and, thus, different costs for service provision. Or they serve as so 
called service supply hubs, forming a single interface to the customer and using mul-
tiple service suppliers in the backend [12]. These factors and associate costs to the 
service provider are not fully known to the consumers.  
Consumers and providers interact bilaterally. There is no third party running a cen-
tral exchange. All parties act rationally and strategically in their own interest. Since 
consumers’ and providers’ types are not publicly known, the market exhibits uncer-
tainty of the optimal matching. To facilitate online scenarios with low transactions 
costs, interaction is restricted to two-stage mechanisms, in preference to more compli-
cated negotiation mechanisms. This simplification follows the standard assumption in 
bargaining models that delay of reaching an agreement is costly and, thus, rational 
agents should reach an agreement immediately with their first offers (cf. the seminal 
paper by [13] and the literature building on it). It remains future work to extend the 
analysis to more complex, iterative mechanisms. 
Academia suggests several market mechanisms to be used in such a scenario. The 
simplest and most widely used mechanism is a fixed price for a specifically defined 
service without any further information exchange. Such a fixed price can either be set 
by the provider or the consumer. In both cases, the bidding language is very simple, 
yet very little information is transferred hindering the discovery of the optimal service 
specification given the provider’s and consumer’s types. In game theoretic terms, 
such a fixed price offer is an ultimatum game, the simplest form of a negotiation 
mechanism. A subtle variation commonly observed in practice is to not offer a single 
quality-price combination, but a small set of such combinations to choose from. This 
increases the likelihood of discovering the optimal service specification at the cost of 
complexity of decision making for both sides. 
More complex mechanisms to tackle the multi-dimensionality are multi-attribute 
negotiations and auctions. They allow for the negotiation on non-price attributes [e.g., 
14]. Many examples for electronic markets that can handle the complex sale or pro-
curement of multi-attribute services and products through automated negotiation exist 
[15-17]. Such mechanisms’ bidding languages are rich – a lot of information is ex-
changed. Multi-attribute auctions based on the family of VCG mechanism are incen-
tive compatible and efficient, yet they suffer from the impossibility to balance the 
budget. Approaches to achieve budget balance by foregoing efficiency mostly result 
in highly complex mechanisms, either with respect to their accomplishment or, due to 
139 
 
 
 
complex transfer functions, with respect to the strategies. For instance, [2] introduces 
an iterative protocol while [11] proposes budget balanced approximations of VCG 
mechanisms, at the cost of sophisticated transfer functions which lead to complex 
strategy considerations. 
In summary, common mechanisms in the scenario sketched above either reveal 
very little information, or their bidding language and/or transfer function is complex. 
The information exchanged is oftentimes biased by strategic behavior of the partici-
pants. This circumstance suggests that there is a trade-off between the simplicity of a 
mechanism and the information content exchanged between the negotiating parties. 
Moreover, strategic misrepresentation of preferences can be observed due to the mix-
ture of integrative and distributive parts of the negotiations. 
We seek a mechanism that fulfills individual rationality and budget balance and, at 
the same time, keeps efficiency as well as truthful information content high, while 
maintaining a simple bidding language. In order to evaluate how different mecha-
nisms perform in the present setting, we scrutinize the following three mechanisms: 
1. TUPLEBIDDING: One party poses a fixed price offer, i.e. a single price-
quality tuple. The other party either accepts or not. 
2. SCORINGBIDDING: One party proposes a complete scoring function over the 
set of possible price-quality combinations. The other party either selects one 
tuple described by this function or rejects to agree at all. 
3. DISCOUNTBIDDING: Like SCORINGBIDDING, but in addition to the scoring 
function, the proposing party requests a price discount it requires on any tu-
ple described by the scoring function. 
TUPLEBIDDING and SCORINGBIDDING represent extreme cases on the continuum of 
simple and rich information exchange. They are stylized representations of commonly 
used fixed price and multi-attribute mechanisms. Intermediate versions like proposing 
multiple price-quality tuples and extensions like repeated offer exchanges are possible 
but offer only limited insight in qualitative differences of the mechanisms’ mechanics. 
DISCOUNTBIDDING is newly introduced as an extension of SCORINGBIDDING. The 
basic idea is to separate the integrative and distributive element of the negotiation 
with the scoring function allowing to identify the optimal price-quality combination 
and the discount factor allowing to claim value. All three mechanisms are formally 
characterized and evaluated in the following. 
3 Formalization and Evaluation of Negotiation Mechanisms  
In this section, we first formalize the model of preferences and the negotiation mech-
anisms. We then evaluate the mechanisms under complete information, i.e. the pro-
vider and the consumer knowing each other’s types. While this setting is rather hypo-
thetical, it serves as benchmark for the more realistic case of incomplete information. 
An evaluation of the mechanisms under incomplete information with different de-
grees of risk and risk aversion will provide a thorough understanding. A comparison 
of all mechanisms concludes this section and discusses which mechanism will prevail 
depending on who decides on the mechanism. 
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3.1 Model of Preferences and Key Assumptions 
Consider two parties, service provider P  and consumer C , both being individually 
rational and maximizing their utility. P  and C  negotiate over quality  q and 
price   p of a service. Quality q  may be an aggregated abstraction of various quality 
attributes of interest to C  [cf. 12]. Following standard micro-economic theory [e.g., 
18] we assume that the consumer C  has decreasing marginal returns from increasing 
quality, i.e. a concave scoring function. Analogously, we assume that the provider P  
has a production technology which yields decreasing marginal returns. An example: 
This assumption asserts that a provider who guarantees availability of a Cloud service 
requires more resources to increase availability from 98% to 99% than he needs to 
increase it from 94% to 95%. Adding the assumption of approximately linear costs of 
resources, this yields a convex cost function, which is again typical in micro-
economic modeling [e.g., 18].  
Operationalization of the assumptions: Both quality and price are individually 
normalized to the unit interval: (0,1)q  , (0,1)p  . This simplification allows for more 
comprehensible analytical considerations without significantly limiting interpretabil-
ity of results. The provider’s cost function and the consumer’s scoring function are 
both modeled as monomials for three reasons: (1) It is a common approach in the 
related literature to capture each quality-attribute with one monomial [e.g., 1, 19]. (2) 
It allows for both simple and comprehensible analytical considerations along with 
computational tractability and (3) it ensures proximity to realistic scenarios under 
consideration of the preference elicitation challenges. In effect, we assume the pro-
vider P  has a cost function   b C q q  with b [1, )  representing the cost of provid-
ing a service of given quality. 1 b  yields a linear, b 1  a convex cost function with 
positive and increasing marginal costs of quality. The provider P  has the quasi-linear 
utility function    U q p C q P . For consumer C  we assume the scoring func-
tion   aS q q  with (0, )a b . 0a   ensures strong monotonicity in quality, i.e. C  pre-
fers a higher quality over a lower quality, and a b  ensures the existence of a mutual-
ly beneficial agreement. In practice and for a given provider and consumer it might be 
the case that no mutually beneficial agreement on a q-p-tuple exists. However, in this 
case no mechanism could yield an individually rational agreement. We omit this case 
and assume the existence of a mutually beneficial agreement for comparing the ability 
of different negotiation mechanisms in identifying the optimal agreement. 
Under incomplete information, we allow for the consumer being risk neutral or risk 
averse. To capture C ’s risk preferences, we employ – analogous to the provider – a 
quasi-linear utility function additionally wrapped by a term that introduces constant 
relative risk aversion [e.g., 20].  C ’s utility function becomes     
1
1 rU q S q p  C ; 
0r   implies C  being risk-neutral, while an increasing 0r   implies C  being in-
creasingly risk averse.  
The economic surplus – also termed welfare – generated by an agreement is de-
fined as sum of utilities      ( )W q U q U q C P . For a risk neutral consumer or for com-
plete information, this simplifies to      a bW q q q  , i.e. welfare is determined by the 
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quality that the two negotiating parties agree on. The price is merely the mechanism 
for distributing welfare.3 
The optimal quality *q  maximizing welfare is 
 
1
*   argmax ( )  0,1 
a b
q
bq W q
a
    
   with 
*   
a b
a b a bb bw
a a
        
     
Fig. 1 sketches an example of the above model with  0.5a  ,  2b   and resulting 
*q 0.397 . The price is arbitrarily chosen as    * *0.35 [ , ]p C q S q   and both parties’ 
utilities are positive. 
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Fig. 1. Example for scoring and cost functions, optimal quality, price and utilities 
Graphically, the assumptions on ( )C q  and ( )S q  assure the existence of an area of 
individually rational potential agreements in between the two curves. The objective of 
a negotiation is to determine a point { , }q p  within this area. It is in both parties’ inter-
est and Pareto optimal to choose *  q q . This maximizes welfare. The price p  any-
where on the intersection of *  q with the area distributes this welfare. For an omnisci-
ent arbitrator with given fairness perception, this is relatively easy. For P  and C  
under incomplete information and strategic behavior, this is, however, very complex. 
3.2 Negotiation Mechanisms 
Three negotiation mechanisms can help P  and C  in their complex task. Without loss 
of generality, we assume the consumer C  going first and the provider P  responding 
to the offer. As the scenario and model are symmetric with respect to the roles, the 
evaluation with an inverted order of action follows analogously. 
TUPLEBIDDING: C  submits a binding bid { , }q p . P  can accept this tuple as 
agreement or reject it leading to no agreement. Assuming myopic utility maximiza-
tion within the negotiation, P  accepts if ( )p C q  and rejects otherwise. For brevity 
of the analysis, we assume acceptance in case of indifference. 
                                                           
3 In order to compare welfare across levels of risk aversion and in order not to overvalue the 
utility of C , we adapt the welfare function in case of 0r   by back-transforming  U qC . 
(1) 
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SCORINGBIDDING: C  submits a binding bid of a scoring function ˆ( )S q  or (in a 
less generic setting) the parameters of a scoring function, e.g., aˆ  for   ˆˆ aS q q . C  can 
(and will) choose  ˆ ( )S q S q , i.e. she can strategically misrepresent her type. P  sets 
a quality qˆ  and price ˆ( )ˆpˆ S q . {ˆ, }ˆq p  is the agreement. If there exists a qˆ  with 
  Cˆ ˆ q)ˆ(S q  , P  maximizes his utility with  ˆˆ ˆp S q  and  arg ( )ˆmaxˆ
q
q S q C q  . Oth-
erwise, P  rejects any agreement. 
DISCOUNTBIDDING: C  submits a binding bid of a scoring function  Sˆ q  or a sin-
gle parameter, e.g., aˆ . In addition, C  submits a discount value d . P  sets a quality qˆ  
and price  ˆˆ ˆp S q d  . {ˆ, }ˆq p  is the agreement. If there exists a qˆ  with   dˆ (qˆ)ˆ CS q   , 
P  maximizes his utility with  ˆˆ ˆp S q d   and  ˆˆ argmax ( )
q
q S q d C q   . Otherwise, 
P  rejects any agreement. 
3.3 Evaluation 
For the case of complete information, we derive optimal bidding behavior, utility, and 
welfare for both C  and P  analytically. With complete information, C  knows P ’s 
cost function ( )C q  and profit maximizing decision function. Analytically, one can 
derive the following equilibria: In either of the three mechanisms, provider P  will be 
left with a utility of zero. Consumer C  can claim the entire maximum possible surplus 
in both TUPLEBIDDING and DISCOUNTBIDDING, yielding a utility  
a b
a b a b *b bU w
a a
         
   
C . SCORINGBIDDING is sub-optimal from both welfare and con-
sumer’s perspective, with 
a
*b 1U e w
e

  C .
4 
Let us consider the more realistic case of incomplete information and risk aversion. 
Incomplete information implies risk in the decision making of C . C  continues being 
perfectly informed with one exception: the provider’s cost function, here operational-
ized as parameter b . C  only knows that b  is uniformly distributed:  ,b m s m s  U  
with m  and s  being public knowledge. s  is a proxy for C ’s risk; the higher s , the 
higher the risk. P  still knows b , i.e. his cost function. The case of complete infor-
mation could be solved analytically; for incomplete information, we choose a numeri-
cal analysis with a wide range of parameters a , b , s , r  as input to the simulation in 
order to test for sensitivities and assure robustness of the results. For brevity and sim-
plicity, the following presentation focuses on a limited set of parameters ( 0.5a  , 
2b  , 1r  ,  0,1 s ).5 
Three reasons make us believe that the numerical solution is accurate: (1) For the 
border case of complete information, the numerical and the analytical solution coin-
                                                           
4 Proofs can be obtained from the authors upon request. 
5 A wider range of results is available from the authors upon request. 
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cide; (2) all strategic effects and utility comparisons vary either smoothly within the 
parameter range or, in case of step functions, are straightforward to explain; (3) the 
qualitative effects hold true for all parameter configurations tested. 
TupleBidding.Obviously,  C ’s bid consisting of q  and p  has two effects: It de-
termines the likelihood of reaching an agreement and the utility of an agreement, 
should it be achieved. In bidding, C  trades-off these two directly opposed effects for 
maximizing her expected utility. In the border case of complete information ( 0s  ), 
bidding is straightforward and the numerical simulation coincides with the analytical 
solution presented above. Any  ,q p -tuple belongs to either of two sets: Either it 
leads to agreement with certainty or to disagreement with certainty. Among the tuples 
that lead to an agreement, C  maximizes her utility by choosing the efficient alloca-
tion. 
When introducing risk ( 0s  ), C ’s optimization problem becomes more tricky. 
For increasing s , C  initially prefers bidding more conservatively, i.e. she foregoes 
utility from the agreement but assures reaching agreement with 100% certainty. She 
does so by simultaneously lowering q  and increasing p  (both to her disadvantage in 
case of agreement), i.e. by moving the bid to the upper left in Fig. 2. At one point – 
called “tipping point” t  from here on –, s  becomes excessive from C ’s viewpoint. C  
stops retracting and starts bidding more aggressive. From s t  onwards, C  simulta-
neously increases q  and decreases p ; she demands higher utility in case of agree-
ment and takes the risk of not reaching an agreement. 
Under complete information ( 0s  ), the efficient agreement is reached, C  claims 
all the value, and P  has a utility of zero. Welfare, i.e. the sum of utilities, is at its 
maximum. With increasing risk 0s  , C ’s utility decreases monotonically and in-
creasingly rapidly – up to the tipping point (Fig. a). At the tipping point, C  changes 
her strategy (see above): The monotonic decline of expected utility persists, but is 
slowed down. As C ’s risk increases, P ’s utility increases – again, up to the tipping 
point, when P ’s expected utility reaches its maximum and then sharply declines with 
further increasing risk (Fig. b). The effect on welfare is straightforward: Welfare is 
optimal for 0s  . With risk, the parties on average no longer agree on the efficient 
allocation; welfare declines gradually. With risk s  beyond the tipping point t , when 
P ’s utility declines, the decline of welfare increases its speed (Fig. c). 
ScoringBidding. C  faces the same trade-off as with price-quality tuples: utility in 
case of agreement vs. the likelihood of reaching agreement. C ’s strategy in bidding a 
scoring function follows the same pattern as in bidding a price-quality tuple: With 
increasing risk ( s ), the consumer bids more conservatively. Technically, he decreases 
aˆ  and bids more truthfully. He does so sufficiently to assure certainty of reaching an 
agreement. Again, this holds up to the tipping point t , at which C  starts gambling, 
i.e. she gradually increases aˆ  for claiming more value at the risk of not reaching 
agreement. With increasing risk aversion, the cost of gambling rises and, thus, the 
tipping point rises. Interestingly, the tipping point coincides with the tipping point for 
bidding price-quality tuples for any r . C ’s and P ’s expected utility as well as wel-
fare all three qualitatively resemble the patterns from TUPLEBIDDING for varying s  
and r . 
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C ’s expected utility is maximal for 0s   and decreases monotonically for increas-
ing s  (Fig. a). The decrease speeds up for increasing s  up to the tipping point and 
slows down from t s  onwards. P ’s expected utility is zero for 0s  , increases 
monotonically for increasing s  up to the tipping point. It sharply kinks at s t  and 
decreases thereafter (Fig. b). 
Interestingly, welfare is optimal for s t . 
Strategic bidding by C  hinders the integra-
tive part of the negotiation. Risk initially 
lowers C ’s strategic misrepresentation and 
thereby allows  P  to come closer to the 
efficient quality. At 0s  , C  submits a bid 
of aˆ  as close as possible to b , optimizing 
her own utility, yet sacrificing efficiency by 
overbidding by almost four times the real 
value a  (for 0.5a   and 2.0b  ). As be-
fore, with increasing risk ( 0s  ), C  will 
lower her bid, thus increasing efficiency 
simultaneously. After passing the utmost 
efficient point for s t , C  starts gambling 
by raising aˆ  and welfare starts to rapidly 
decline again (Fig. c). 
DiscountBidding. C ’s trade-off is the 
same as for the other mechanisms, only the 
vehicle of bidding more or less conserva-
tively differs. It can be implemented by 
either lowering aˆ , or by lowering d , or 
both. The interesting question is which of 
these vehicles C  chooses to maximize her 
expected utility. 
Analogously to the analytical results in 
case of complete information, bidding the 
scoring function truthfully ( aˆ a ) and 
claiming value via d  is the strategy max-
imizing C ’s expected utility. For the func-
tional forms of  C q  and  S q  being 
strongly convex/concave, bidding the scor-
ing function truthfully is the only optimum. 
Considering, for instance, the border case 
of 0s  : C  knows the efficient allocation 
that maximizes her utility and needs to derive a bid {ˆ, }a d  to meet that very allocation. 
With aˆ a , the provider’s optimization will yield a sub-optimal quality; value is lost 
and cannot be regained by any d . Numerical results show that the same holds true 
under risk. For more general scoring and bidding functions, however, bidding the 
scoring function truthfully might not be the only optimum – it is, however, always 
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Fig. 2. Comparison of negotiation mecha-
nisms with respect to utility and welfare 
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one optimum, as long as P  chooses the efficient quality q  for a truthful bid. Again, 
the qualitative patterns in strategies and utilities resemble what is known from the 
other mechanisms: With increasing s , C  initially bids more and more conservative, 
lowering d . The tipping point t  exists at which this pattern inverts and C  switches to 
gambling, i.e. to increasing d . Up to t , C ’s utility decreases in s  and P ’s utility 
increases. For increasing s t , the decline of C ’s utility slows down (Fig. a) and P ’s 
utility decreases as well (Fig. b). Welfare decreases in s  with a kink at t  (Fig. c). 
Increasing risk aversion r  increases t  but does not qualitatively affect behavior or 
outcomes. All variation in C ’s bidding depending on s  and r  takes place in the dis-
count d ; the revelation of the scoring function remains truthful ( aˆ a ). 
In summary, discount bidding effectively disentangles the integrative and distribu-
tive elements of the negotiation. Bidding the scoring function truthfully allows max-
imizing the consumer’s expected utility and expected welfare in any given state of the 
world, i.e. for any combination of provider cost function (parameter b ), consumer 
scoring function (parameter a ), and consumer risk aversion (parameter r ). A com-
parison of DISCOUNTBIDDING and SCORINGBIDDING shows that this truthfulness is 
only possible, as the discount factor d  provides the consumer a vehicle to claim val-
ue, i.e. d  is the distributive element of the negotiation. Truthfulness in the scoring 
function is an interesting and potentially beneficial property of the discount bidding 
mechanism. The even more interesting question is, however, how the three mecha-
nisms compare in terms of utility for one or the other party, as this will drive adoption 
in the marketplace. The following section presents this comparison. 
3.4 Implication for Adoption of Negotiation Mechanisms 
This section provides a comparison of the three mechanisms regarding utility and 
welfare and discusses which mechanism will prevail depending on who decides on 
the mechanism. With complete information TUPLEBIDDING allows the consumer to 
choose the efficient allocation *q  while claiming the entire surplus by setting the 
price to the value of P ’s cost function. The same is possible when 
DISCOUNTBIDDING is implemented, as C  can use the discount d  to obtain the entire 
surplus, while ensuring efficiency by truthfully bidding aˆ . Thus, under complete 
information, both mechanisms result in the same allocation, utility and welfare. 
Intuitively, SCORINGBIDDING cannot achieve the same efficiency, as C  is always 
tempted to misrepresent her type by overbidding aˆ , thus leading to a quality other 
than *q . Despite the fact that it yields the same utility for P , it turns out that 
SCORINGBIDDING leads to a lower utility for C , which also implies a lower welfare 
than when using TUPLEBIDDING or DISCOUNTBIDDING as negotiation mechanism.  
With incomplete information, Fig. a shows that for any given risk s , the consum-
er’s expected utility is equal for DISCOUNTBIDDING and TUPLEBIDDING (the lines are 
exactly on top of each other) and strictly lower for SCORINGBIDDING. This result is 
independent of the consumer’s risk aversion. The implication is twofold: (1) When 
the consumer can choose the mechanism, she will prefer either DISCOUNTBIDDING or 
TUPLEBIDDING over SCORINGBIDDING. The consumer may have the ability to choose 
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the mechanism when either there are multiple providers offering different mecha-
nisms, or when she has sufficient purchasing power to dictate the mechanism. (2) 
When the consumer has the chance to reduce her risk at a reasonable cost in terms of 
time and money, she will do so. She may have the chance to acquire information ei-
ther by standard market research, or by learning from repeated negotiations with a 
single or with multiple providers. 
From the provider’s view, there is a clear ranking of the three mechanisms  
(Fig. b): SCORINGBIDDING is preferred over DISCOUNTBIDDING which is preferred 
over TUPLEBIDDING. This holds for all 0s  ; for 0s  , the provider is indifferent 
between the three mechanisms. The implication is, again, twofold: (1) When the pro-
vider chooses the mechanism, he will choose SCORINGBIDDING. (2) When the provid-
er can influence the consumer’s risk, he will do so. He will try to provoke conserva-
tive bidding by the consumer but will not exaggerate the risk to a level where the 
consumer starts gambling and the provider risks not reaching an agreement at all. The 
provider can, e.g., influence risk by withholding information on the exact technology 
employed and on his costs. Both are common in real-world settings. The provider has, 
however, an interest on providing some information on technology and, thus, on im-
plied costs. Again, this is a common behavior in real-world settings. The ranking of 
mechanisms from the provider’s viewpoint is independent of the consumer’s risk 
aversion. The provider’s strategic manipulation of the consumer’s risk, e.g., by 
providing or withholding information on the technology and associated costs, depends 
on the consumer’s risk aversion. This, in turn creates risk on the provider side with 
regard to the exact degree of the consumer’s risk aversion. The analysis of equilibria 
in this extended game is beyond the scope of this paper. 
The welfare perspective combines the above perspectives and, again, provides a 
ranking of mechanisms. Interestingly, for the case of the consumer being risk averse, 
this ranking depends on the level of risk (Fig. c). For low risk, welfare from 
TUPLEBIDDING is higher than from SCORINGBIDDING. For high risk and risk aversion, 
this ranking inverts. In any case, DISCOUNTBIDDING results in at least the same wel-
fare for the special case of 0s   and strictly higher expected welfare for the general 
case of 0s  . This result leads to the following implication: When a third party can 
choose the mechanism and intends to maximize welfare, it will select 
DISCOUNTBIDDING, independent of risk and risk aversion. Note, however, that in the 
scenario studied in this paper, it is rather unlikely that a third party like a regulator 
imposes a mechanism to the bilateral negotiation. 
Looking beyond the scope of a single negotiation, two observations stand out: 
Firstly, the provider will strategically manipulate the consumer’s risk prior to the 
negotiation, if he has the chance of doing so (which will hold true in most real-world 
settings). His challenge is to find the optimal degree of risk, as neither a low nor a 
high risk by the consumer is optimal for the provider. Secondly, DISCOUNTBIDDING is 
an attractive mechanism, but far from certain to be adopted in practice. In the extend-
ed game of selecting a mechanism, TUPLEBIDDING is not Pareto-optimal, it is domi-
nated by DISCOUNTBIDDING. DISCOUNTBIDDING will prevail when either the con-
sumer or a third party have the discretion or power to impose a mechanism. Bidding 
scoring functions will be adopted when the provider decides on the mechanism. 
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A positive side effect exists that might increase the provider’s utility from 
DISCOUNTBIDDING in the long term: DISCOUNTBIDDING promotes truthful revelation 
of the consumer’s scoring function and, thereby, allows the provider to optimize his 
technology portfolio and cost structure in the long-term. This effect – that is not re-
flected in the provider’s utility function in this paper – might lead to all parties unan-
imously preferring discount bidding over the other mechanisms. 
4 Conclusion & Future Work 
This paper is set in the scenario of IT-based individualized services that require 
matching of functional requirements and in addition the negotiation of non-functional 
aspects. Specifically, we studied bilateral negotiations on quality and price of a ser-
vice between the service provider and the consumer. In this setting, a negotiation has 
an integrative facet – many possible qualities of service are sub-optimal, but by means 
of communication within the negotiation mechanism, the parties can identify a Pare-
to-optimal quality of service. On the other hand, the negotiation has a distributive 
facet – either party has an interest in claiming as large a share in the value from an 
agreement as possible. Strategic bidding typically leads to negotiators mixing the 
integrative and distributive facets which results in inefficient outcomes. 
In such a scenario, the selection of an “optimal” or at least “satisfying” negotiation 
mechanism is a challenge. In the light of mechanism design theory [8], we postulated 
individual rationality and budget balance for analyzing economic properties of differ-
ent negotiation mechanisms, namely in how far agents’ negotiation strategies deviate 
from truthful revelation of their types and in how far efficiency of negotiated agree-
ments deviates from the efficient agreement an omniscient arbitrator would define.  
On this theoretical background, we compared three negotiation mechanisms: 
TUPLEBIDDING, SCORINGBIDDING and DISCOUNTBIDDING. TUPLEBIDDING serves as a 
proxy for commonly used fixed price mechanisms; SCORINGBIDDING resembles the 
widely used approach of agents bidding a scoring function, e.g., in multi-attribute 
auctions. DISCOUNTBIDDING was newly introduced in this paper – it allows bidding a 
scoring function and additionally a discount that the consumer demands from the 
provider. The intuition is that this approach disentangles the integrative and distribu-
tive facets of the negotiation and increases efficiency. Our results confirmed this in-
tuition: For complete information, we derived these results analytically from the game 
theoretic equilibrium; for the extended case of incomplete information, risk and risk 
aversion, we used a numerical simulation to characterize the mechanisms. 
TUPLEBIDDING is not Pareto-optimal but dominated by DISCOUNTBIDDING. Thus, 
it is unlikely to prevail in a marketplace for custom services as soon as this market 
matures. Nowadays, comparable mechanisms are used by some Cloud service provid-
ers, for example. It has the advantage of a simple bidding language and very little 
communication effort. However, as providers and consumers get more sophisticated 
and as automated negotiations become more prevalent, the disadvantageous economic 
properties will weigh heavier and TUPLEBIDDING might become less relevant. 
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SCORINGBIDDING emphasizes the integrative facet and yields higher expected utili-
ty for the provider than either of the other mechanisms. When the provider can dictate 
the choice of the mechanism, he will presumably favor SCORINGBIDDING. However, 
the consumer’s strategic misrepresentation of her scoring function leads to sub-
optimal agreements. DISCOUNTBIDDING captures even more of the integrative facet: it 
promotes truthful revelation of the consumer’s scoring function and thereby allows 
reaching an efficient agreement more often than with SCORINGBIDDING. The expected 
welfare from DISCOUNTBIDDING is higher than from SCORINGBIDDING for any level 
of risk and risk aversion. Compared to SCORINGBIDDING, the discount factor in 
DISCOUNTBIDDING shifts utility from the provider to the consumer. Whenever the 
consumer or an independent third party can dictate the negotiation mechanism, she 
will tend to favor DISCOUNTBIDDING. A positive long-term effect of 
DISCOUNTBIDDING is that truthful revelation of the consumer’s scoring function al-
lows the provider to adapt his technology and service offering. In the long run, this 
may even overturn the provider’s favoritism for SCORINGBIDDING. 
All mechanisms show a tipping point in the consumer’s behavior depending on the 
risk: with risk below this tipping point, the consumer bids conservatively and assures 
reaching an agreement; beyond this risk, she bids aggressively and risks not reaching 
an agreement. For a given level of risk aversion, this tipping point is – somewhat 
surprisingly – identical for all three mechanisms. 
In each mechanism, the provider has an incentive to strategically manipulate the 
consumer’s risk via the information provided on his technology and costs. Neither full 
transparency nor opacity are optimal for the provider; he will have to carefully chose 
the level of information depending on the consumer’s risk aversion. The higher the 
consumer’s risk aversion, the less information will be given by the provider. All re-
sults hold inversely when inverting the roles of consumer and provider. 
The presented work has four main limitations: (1) We assume individually rational 
utility maximizing agents. (2) The results depend on the model of preferences, espe-
cially on the functional forms of cost, scoring, and utility functions. While we believe 
that similar results can be obtained for other preferences, this has not been proven yet. 
(3) We study “only” three distinct mechanisms without deriving an “optimal mecha-
nism” in the mechanism design sense. However, given the complexity and impossibil-
ity theorems, we believe this comparison of existing mechanisms and introduction of 
DISCOUNTBIDDING as additional mechanism is a valuable contribution to the field. (4) 
All three mechanisms only allow for a single offer and its acceptance or rejection by 
the counterparty. More complex negotiation mechanisms with an alternating offer 
exchange are possible, so is the introduction of a central marketplace. 
Future work will address these limitations and, for instance, study other formaliza-
tions of preferences, behavior by human agents, more complex negotiation mecha-
nisms, and the comparison of bilateral mechanisms with a centralized exchange. 
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